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  2Abstract 
 
In this paper we analyse the impact of the regulatory framework for the new regulatory 
period (2011 – 2013) on the long-term profitability of TenneT TSO, the operator of the high-
voltage electricity network in the Netherlands. Long-term profitability is a key component of 
the financeability of a firm. In the long run, the return on capital should be at least equal to 
the opportunity costs of capital in order to finance investments. As the ultimate indicator 
for the long-term profitability, we use the net present value of economic profit, which is the 
difference between total revenues and total costs, including a normal return on capital. In 
order to simulate the future financial development of the TSO, we developed a model. 
 
On the basis of the model analysis, making a number of methodological assumptions, we 
conclude that the tariff regulation results in a positive long-term profitability, implying that 
the regulatory framework enables TenneT TSO to finance its investments in replacement 
and network expansion. In the long run all costs, including the normal costs of capital, will 
be fully compensated by the revenues, resulting in a (slightly) positive net present value of 
economic profit. This conclusion is subject to the condition that the TSO eliminates the 
existing inefficiencies in the network and that it is able to annually improve its overall 
efficiency. If this condition is not met, the shareholder might face a loss of more than one 
hundred million Euros. 
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  5  6Summary 
1.  In this paper we analyse the impact of tariff regulation on the long-term profitability of 
TenneT TSO, the operator of the high-voltage electricity network in the Netherlands. 
Analysing the impact of regulation on the profitability of this network operator is 
particularly relevant because of the significant rise in investments the TSO foresees for 
the near future. TenneT expects to triple or even to quadruple its annual level of 
investments. In order to determine whether the regulatory framework for the new 
regulatory period (2011 – 2013) is able to deal with this strong increase in investments, 
we analyse the impact on long-term profitability, which is a key component of 
financeability of investments. 
 
2.  In order to analyse this issue, we need to narrow the scope of our research. We do not 
go into other aspects of financeability, such as the short-term liquidity. In addition, we 
ignore the influence of volatile general economic parameters, such as interest rates and 
energy prices, during a regulatory period. We also assume that the network operator 
behaves prudently and that the investments are efficient. Moreover, we ignore the 
influence of non-financial factors on the supply of capital. The focus on the impact of 
regulation is also the reason that we base the model on regulatory accounting data 
instead of commercial data. Because of these methodological assumptions, the results 
of this paper cannot be seen as forecasts on the future financial position of the TSO. 
 
3.  We expect a firm to be able to offer investors a sufficient reward on capital if, in the 
long run, the return on capital equals or exceeds the opportunity costs of capital, 
measured by the WACC.  As the ultimate indicator for long-term profitability, we use the 
net present value (NPV) of economic profit, where the critical value is zero. Note, 
however, that the legal regulatory framework prescribes that the rate of return should 
also not be higher than the opportunity costs of capital. This legal prescription on the 
one hand and the need to finance investments on the other make that in principle the 
NPV of the economic profit should be (very close to) zero. 
 
4.  In order to determine the impact of regulation on the long-term profitability of a 
network operator, we developed a calculation model simulating the future annual 
financial development of the firm. The model consists of three major building blocks. 
  7The first building block refers to the actual characteristics of the firm. The second 
building block refers to factors affecting the future development, in particular the 
parameters of the regulatory framework and the behaviour of the firm regarding 
investments and efficiency improvements. The third component is the set of calculation 
rules needed to combine the first two components.  
 
5.  On the basis of the model analysis, we conclude that the new regulatory framework for 
the period 2011 – 2013 enables TenneT TSO to finance investments in replacement and 
network expansion. In the long run all (efficient) costs, including the normal costs of 
capital, will be fully compensated by the revenues. This conclusion is subject to the 
condition that the TSO eliminates the existing inefficiencies in the network and that it is 
able to improve its overall efficiency as is assumed in the regulatory framework.  
 
6.  In the short term, the rate of return is below the opportunity costs of capital if the 
operator raises its level of investments significantly, because of the fact that regulated 
revenues lag behind costs. This time lag follows from the regulatory principle to use 
actual accounting data as the best approach for estimating future levels of efficient 
costs. The timing as well as the size of the investment affect the profitability. Although 
this effect is not negligible, it seems to be fairly small, compared to the impact of 
efficiency improvements within the firm. The latter factor appears to be crucial to the 
overall profitability and, hence, the financeability, of the operator.  
 
7.  Although the regulatory framework enables TenneT to generate sufficient profits in the 
long run, this does not mean that shareholders are not needed to contribute. In 
particular in years of relatively high investments, more equity is needed as a source of 
capital. The indispensability of shareholders in that case results from the fact that the 
supply of debt capital is limited by several financial criteria, such as the gearing.  
 
8.  Finally, we stress the importance of a using a long-term perspective in assessing the 
profitability of a firm. Not only ex ante, as we have done in this research, but also ex 
post. After all, profits might temporarily be below or above normal levels because of the 
characteristics of the tariff regulation, in particular the time-lag in the reimbursement of 
(efficient) costs. Moreover, committing to a long-term perspective contributes to a 
climate where investors are less inclined to hold-up efficient investments. 
  81  Introduction 
1.1  Background 
In industries suffering from a structural lack of competition, governments in many 
countries have implemented regulatory measures to restrict the behaviour of these firms in 
one way or another. These measures are generally meant to provide firms with incentives 
to raise productive efficiency, while at the same time allocative efficiency is pursued by 
protecting consumers from too high prices. In setting the targets for productive and 
allocative efficiency, the regulator has to take into account an important restriction. This 
restriction is that the regulated firms should be able to finance all the activities which they 
are legally obliged to do. This restriction is related to the tightness of regulation (see 
Vogelsang, 2002). The tightness describes how much profit a firm is allowed to make in 
normal circumstances. If the profit rate is below the opportunity costs per unit of capital, a 
firm will have serious difficulties in attracting equity and debt in order to finance 
investments. A necessary condition in regulating any industry, therefore, is that the 
regulation should not be too tight, i.e. that the firms should be able to generate a normal 
profit in the long term. 
1.2  Research question 
In this paper we analyse the impact of regulation on the long-term profitability of a network 
operator. This analysis is directed at the tariff regulation of TenneT TSO, the Dutch 
operator of the high-voltage network in the Netherlands. TenneT TSO is a fully separated 
network operator and a subsidiary of TenneT Holding, which is 100% state-owned.
 1 The 
revenues of TenneT TSO are subject to regulation by the NMa. This regulation can be 
characterised as intermediate or output-oriented regulation, which means that it is directed 
at the outcome of the network in stead of at the inputs. This characteristic is based on the 
general idea that operators have far more knowledge about efficient network management 
than regulators do. Consequently, an operator faces the full responsibility of network 
management, while the regulator monitors whether the statutory tasks are performed as 
efficiently as possible. 
 
                                                            
1 In this paper, we use the name ‘TenneT’ to refer to the holding and ‘TenneT TSO’ to refer to the TSO part of 
the holding. 
  9Analysing the impact of regulation on the long-term profitability of TenneT TSO is 
particularly relevant because of the significant rise in investments the TSO foresees for the 
near future. TenneT TSO expects to triple or even to quadruple its annual level of 
investments. According to its latest annual report, TenneT will spend approximately € 3 
billion on constructing new connections and upgrading existing grid infrastructure in the 
Netherlands in the next five to seven years (TenneT, 2009). This investment programme 
includes the development of a southern connection (the so-called ‘South Ring’) and the 
construction of new 380 kV connections and high-voltage substations in other regions in 
the Netherlands. TenneT views these network expansions to be necessary to facilitate both 
the growing demand for electricity and the projected increase in production capacity of 
power plants.   
 
Because of this ambitious investment programme, one can wonder whether an incentive-
based regulatory framework is still adequate. Some authors state that the current 
framework focuses too much on allocative efficiency at the expense of investments (see 
e.g. WRR, 2007). In a backward-looking empirical study, the NMa (2010) concluded that up 
to now there were no indications that the regulatory framework has hindered investments. 
Although that report was directed at distribution networks, its conclusion likely holds for 
TenneT too. In a recently published ex post study into the realised profits of TenneT TSO, 
the NMa (2010) concludes that, on average, the return on capital exceeded the opportunity 
costs of capital, implying that the long-term profitability did not hinder the financeability of 
the firm. In the past years, however, the investment programme was fairly modest, while 
the future investments are likely to be significantly higher. 
 
In order to determine whether the regulatory framework for the new regulatory period (2011 
– 2013)
2 is able to deal with the expected strong increase in investments, we analysed the 
impact on long-term profitability.  The research question of this paper is therefore as 
follows: 
 
To which extent does the regulatory framework for the period 2011 – 2013 enable TenneT TSO to 
offer investors sufficient reward on investments in replacement and network expansion? 
                                                            
2 Since the off take of regulation of TenneT TSO in 2001, there have been four regulatory periods: 2001 – 
2003, 2004 – 2006, 2007 and 2008 – 2010, respectively. 
  101.3  Scope  
This research is restricted to the impact of tariff regulation on one aspect of the 
financeability of a firm, notably the long-term profitability of a firm. Hence, we abstract 
from other aspects of financeability, such as the liquidity in the short term. In addition, we 
ignore the influence  of the volatility in the general economic parameters, such as interest 
rates and energy prices, during a regulatory period. Moreover, we assume that the network 
operator behaves prudently. This means, for instance, that shareholders only receive 
dividends if the firm has made a positive net profit while the related cash is not needed to 
pay instalments or to finance investments. Moreover, we assume that all investments of 
the network operator are efficient. This approach implies that we do not assess the 
technical efficiency of investments, nor whether these investments are efficient from a 
welfare-economic point of view.
3 In addition, we assume that non-financial factors (like 
organisational strengths and weaknesses) do not have any effect on the supply of debt or 
equity. Hence, the supply of capital, both debt and equity, depends only on (specific) 
financial criteria.  
1.4  Method and structure of the paper 
We measure the long-term profitability of the firm by calculating the net present value of 
the future economic profits of the firm. A firm is viewed to have a positive long-term 
profitability, if the return on capital exceeds, in the long run, the opportunity costs of 
capital. It is important to realise that the legal regulatory framework prescribes that the rate 
of return should not be higher than the opportunity costs of capital. This legal prescription 
on the one hand and the need to finance investments on the other make that the NPV of 
the economic profit should be (very close to) zero. 
 
In order to simulate the financial development of a network operator, we developed a 
calculation model. Before describing the model, we first briefly elaborate on regulatory 
principles and the concept of financeability (chapter 2). In chapter 3 we present the main 
outline of the model, while the calculation rules are concisely described in the appendix. In 
chapter 4 we present the results for a number of scenarios. The conclusions are given in 
chapter 5. 
                                                            
3 This assumption is only made for the purpose of this research. Note that the assessment of investments 
and the regulated asset base form a key component of the regulatory framework. 
  112  Regulation of networks 
2.1  Regulatory objectives and instruments 
Competition between operators in network industries is hardly feasible because of the huge 
fixed costs of networks, which gives them a (natural) monopoly (see Dijk, 2007). A 
monopolist is generally viewed to have limited incentives to be as efficient as technically 
possible and to use its market position to charge relatively high (monopoly) prices. If 
network firms would operate in competitive markets, the functioning of the market would 
guarantee that profit-maximising behaviour of individual firms together with utility-
maximising behaviour of consumers result in the optimal outcome from a welfare-
economic point of view. The structural lack of competition and its consequences on welfare 
call for regulation.  
 
The challenge for regulators is therefore to pursue three different (policy) goals. Regulatory 
intervention is needed to give a network operator incentives to generate products and 
services which are needed by society, to operate as efficiently as technically possible and to 
let network users benefit from efficiency improvements within the networks (through 
reduced tariffs). Between these public interests, trade-offs exists (see Viscusi et al., 2005).  
The strength of the incentives for productive efficiency, for instance, is positively related to 
the extent firms are allowed to keep realised efficiency gains. So, increasing the strength of 
the incentives for productive efficiency implies a higher probability that consumers pay 
more than the actual costs, and vice versa. The optimal mix of incentives for productive 
efficiency improvement on the one hand and allocatively efficient prices on the other 
depends on the social preferences regarding these aspects. At least in theory, it can be 
stated that these preferences are translated in the regulatory framework defining how the 
regulator should deal with this trade-off.  
 
Although the need for regulatory intervention might be clear in network industries, the way 
regulation should be implemented is less clear as intervening in firms’ decisions might 
cause significant costs. The difficulty in defining the optimal type of intervention follows 
from the existence of information asymmetry between regulator and regulated firms. This 
asymmetry is related to information about the precise characteristics of the firm as well as 
  12information about its precise behaviour.
4 It is impossible (or highly expensive) for a 
regulator to acquire the same level of information and knowledge as regulated firms have 
about their activities. Therefore, regulated firms are in principle better equipped than 
regulators to choose the optimal production technique, including size and type of 
investments, and to determine the optimal level and type of production. Therefore, heavy-
handed types of regulation, in which the regulator prescribes how the firm should be 
managed, faces a huge risk of implementing inefficient or ineffective measures. 
Intermediate forms of regulation are more appropriate, consisting of measures setting the 
constraints on performance and giving incentives to improve efficiency, while giving the 
firm freedom on actual management decisions.  
Another argument, besides the information asymmetry argument, for giving operators 
freedom of operation follows from the fact that ex ante neither the regulator nor the 
operators know what technique will appear to be the most efficient one. Prescribing one 
technique, therefore, creates the significant risk that this technique would appear not to be 
the best or the most efficient one. If each operator is able to make its own technological 
choice, the benefits of a decentralised organisation come to the fore (see Kay, 2005). This 
means that there is a higher chance that ex post the best technique will be chosen (or 
developed) by at least one of the operators.  
 
In searching for the best regulatory measures, three main types are relevant (see e.g. 
Cambini et al., 2010). Rate-of-return regulation, which gives operators ex ante certainty 
over the rate of return on their investments, is viewed to be most suited to foster 
investments in new infrastructure. Pure price-cap regulation, where the operators have 
certainty about the revenues but face all the risks related to the costs, gives the maximum 
incentives to foster efficiency. Cost-plus regulation, where the revenues of the operator are 
directly related to its costs (including capital costs), realises that network users pay no 
more than the realised costs.  
 
Each of these types of regulation also has some disadvantages. Rate-of-return regulations 
are likely to result in too high a level of investments (from a welfare-economic point of 
                                                            
4 This first component is called hidden information, which in this case means that the firm tries to convince 
the regulator that it operates more efficiently than it actually does. This principal-agent problem is also called 
adverse selection which is the general name for situations where agents have private information (Laffont et 
al., 2002). The second is called hidden behaviour and may result in moral hazard, which means that the 
regulated firm is less inclined to do its utmost if the regulator is unable to monitor and reward that behaviour 
sufficiently. 
  13view) while incentives to operate productively efficient are soft. Pure price-cap regulation is 
generally seen as a disincentive for investments in new infrastructure, as investments 
increase (capital) costs while the revenues of the firm are constant and independent of the 
realised costs (i.e. equal to the price cap). In addition, pure price-cap regulation might 
result in positive economic profits for the operator, implying that grid users pay more than 
is needed to recoup the costs. Cost-plus regulation, finally, gives weak incentives to the 
operator to be efficient, because of the absence of the option to make additional profit, 
while the incentives for investments are not necessarily high. 
2.2  Regulation and financeability 
In this paper we assess a regulatory framework by its impact on financeability. The latter is 
a broad concept that includes several aspects (see e.g. Oxera, 2009). In the short term, 
financeability is a liquidity issue as it depends on the ability to generate sufficient cash for 
operational expenditures as well as for the payment of interests and instalments. If a firm 
is unable to make these payments it can be viewed as technically bankrupt and, hence, 
unable to proceed its activities. In the medium term, financeability refers to the ability of a 
firm to finance replacement investments. Regularly replacing aged assets by new(er) ones 
is a necessary condition for a firm to continue its activities. An inability to finance such 
investments will result in lower quality of the output of a firm and/or higher operational 
costs for maintenance. In the long run, a firm also needs to adapt to changing 
circumstances by, for instance,  extending its activities or changing its production 
technique. If a firm is unable to finance these types of investments, it will not be able to 
survive in the long run. 
 
In case of a regulated firm, tariff regulation has a major influence on the level of total 
revenues of the firm. Other factors influencing the revenues are, depending on the type of 
regulation, the ability of the firm to raise the quantity of the output as well as external 
factors affecting the utilisation of its infrastructure, like weather conditions and the general 
economic conditions. The latter factor also influences the costs: the rate of interest, for 
instance, directly determines the costs of new loans. In general, developments on capital 
markets  affect the costs of capital, as the scarcity of capital on a macro level determines 
both the risk-free rate of interest and the risk premiums on debt and equity. Hence, the 
opportunity costs of capital constantly change in response to supply and demand in the 
(global) capital market. Following the efficient-market hypothesis, one can assume that the 
  14supply of capital is unrestricted as long as the return on investments of a specific firm is at 
least as high as the return for other investments facing a comparable (systematic) risk.   
 
A major driver behind the costs of a regulated firm consists of legal obligations, i.e. the 
activities a firm is obliged to do, such as connecting new energy users to the grid or 
realising a certain level of network quality. As a matter of fact, the management of a firm 
also significantly determines the level and development in costs. This influence is not 
restricted to investments and operational expenditures, but also to relationships with other 
type of activities, in particular other firms within a holding or a vertically-integrated 
company. Hence, the financeability of a network might strongly depend on the degree the 
regulated activities are ring fenced from other activities in a firm. Finally, as cash flows are 
closely linked to revenues and costs, all above factors also strongly affect the liquidity. 
 
As we focus on the impact of tariff regulation on investments, we analyse to which extent 
this regulation enables a firm to generate sufficient returns for investors. This return needs 
to be assessed over a long period of time, since investments in network industries have 
long life times. Because of this horizon, the regulatory framework should, in principle, be 
as constant over time as possible in order to give investors confidence in the stability of 
returns (see e.g. Oxera, 2010).
5 Note, however, that long-term stability has a serious 
downside as regulated revenues might become too low or too high during a (long) 
regulatory period because of technological or economic developments which might 
significantly reduce or raise costs.
6 Consequently, the optimum length of the regulatory 
period is in general the medium term. 
2.3   Tariff regulation of TenneT TSO 
The tariff regulation of TenneT TSO consists of two components: regulation of transport 
activities and regulation of system operator activities. The regulation of the tariffs for 
transport activities is a mixed form of price-cap regulation and cost-plus regulation. This 
regulation has some elements of price-cap regulation insofar the revenues of the transport 
activities are ex ante determined for a certain period of time, independent of the costs 
during that period. At the same time, these revenues are related to the costs in the 
                                                            
5 See also Moody’s (2009), stating:  “For a regulated utility, the predictability and supportiveness of the 
regulatory framework in which it operates is a key credit consideration and the one that differentiates the 
industry from most other corporate sectors.”. 
6 For instance, developments in global capital markets might ask for a higher reward for the costs of capital, 
while technological improvements possibly affect the level of efficient costs (see section 3.4). 
  15previous period, giving the regulation some resemblance to cost-plus regulation. The past 
costs are, however, not directly transferred in future levels of revenues because of the 
assessment of their efficiency (see text box). The regulation is meant to reimburse only 
efficient costs, in contrary to pure cost-plus regulation where realised costs are reimbursed. 
After setting the future levels of revenues, the tariffs on product level are determined 
assuming certain levels of volumes. In contrary to the distributed network operators, 
TenneT TSO does not face a volume risk on transport activities which means that the 
actual revenues are ex post corrected for volume changes. As a result, this regulation is 
also called revenue regulation. The tariff regulation of the system-management activities is 



















Three types of costs: actual costs, costs of best practice and efficient costs 
The regulation of TenneT TSO is based on the principle that consumers should not pay more than the 
costs of an efficiently managed network. We call this level of costs ‘efficient costs’. In order to 
determine this level, information on two other type of costs is needed: the actual costs of the operator 
and the costs of a benchmark. The benchmark is defined as the best practice, which is determined as 
the average of the three best performing firms in an international group of 22 TSOs from 19 countries. 
By relating the (total) costs to the level of output (measured by both capacity and actual production), 
one can determine the efficiency of both TenneT and the benchmark. The higher the output per unit of 
costs, the more efficient a firm is. The ratio between these two efficiency levels is the efficiency score 
of TenneT TSO, stating how efficient this operator is in comparison to the benchmark: 
 
Efficiency score TenneT  = (Output/Costs)TenneT  /  (Output/Costs)benchmark   
 
We need one more parameter to transfer the costs of the best practice into the efficient cost level. This 
parameter is the length of the period in which the actual costs should be reduced to the level of the 
costs of the best practice (Neff). Note, that during this period consumers pay more than the level of 
efficient costs. 
While the concept of efficient costs is used for determining the revenues, the firm also takes measures 
to improve the efficiency in its actual costs. As a matter of fact, the financial situation of a firm is 
strongly influenced by the extent the actually realised efficiency matches the assumed efficiency in the 
regulated revenues. 
The regulation can also be characterised as TOTEX-regulation as the regulated revenues 
are based on total costs. This implies that, in principle, investments are not treated 
separately, but just added to the regulated asset base. Only some investments (i.e. 
“considerable investments”) receive a specific treatment, including a separate efficiency 
assessment as well as the possibility to raise revenues during the current regulatory period. 
  163  The model 
3.1  Introduction  
In order to determine the impact of regulation on the long-term profitability of a network 
operator, we develop a calculation model simulating the future annual financial 
development of the firm.
7 The model consists of three major building blocks. The first 
building block refers to the actual characteristics of the firm. These characteristics, which 
form the starting point for simulating the future development, are derived from the latest 
actual (regulatory) accounting data (see Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1 Outline of the model 
Building block 2: 
Definition of scenarios, describing 
- parameters of the regulatory framework 
- investment programme of the firm 
- assumptions about efficiency improvements within the firm 
Building block 1: 
Data on 
characteristics of the 
firm at the start of the 
period of analysis 
(debt, asset value, 
total revenues, etc.) 
Building block 3: 
Calculation rules to determine financial development in metrics 




The second building block consists of scenarios on the future regulatory framework and the 
behaviour of the firm. It is important to note that the former one is related to the revenues 
of the firm, while the latter affects the costs. This distinction follows directly from the 
general principles behind the regulatory framework. The management is free to decide 
about the way the firm is organised and, for instance, how much it wants to invest, while 
                                                            
7 The model is programmed in GAMS using the interface developed by LEI (see 
http://www3.lei.wur.nl/gamstools/gtree.doc). 
  17the regulator sets the level of the revenues. Several parameters within the regulatory 
framework affect the annual revenues of the firm. In order to analyse the impact of 
individual parameters within the regulatory framework, we define several scenarios for the 
framework. The same holds for the investment programme. This programme is dealt with 
as an exogenous variable, which also varies between some scenarios. In addition, the 
scenarios differ in the extent by which the firm is able to influence its future financial 
position by taking more or less efficiency-improvement measures.  
 
The third building block includes the calculation rules, which combines the former two 
building blocks. These rules describe, for instance, how the parameters of the regulatory 
framework determine annual revenues and how the investment programme of the firm is 
financed. The results of the financial development are measured by the normal financial 
metrics regarding profitability, liquidity and financial structure. We focus of course on the 
indicators directed at the long-term profitability of the firm, in particular the rate of return 
on invested capital as is explained in chapter 2. 
3.2  Building block 1: Empirical data on the characteristics of the firm 
In analysing the future financial development of a firm, we depart from the latest facts 
about the firm’s actual characteristics. These facts are used in two different ways. Firstly, 
data on the actual financial position directly affect the financeability of a firm in the short 
term. The actual gearing, for instance, influences how much additional debt capital the firm 
can acquire. In the long run, this effect vanishes however, as the future annual costs and 
benefits have a larger impact on the future financeability. The second way how data on the 
firm’s current characteristics are used is that they form a reference point for determining 
the future costs and investments of the firm. For instance, the future annual operational 
costs are related to the level of these costs in the base year, while the annual capital costs 
depend on the size of the assets in the base year (and, of course, the investments made 
since that year). 
 
The data in the model are mainly based on regulatory accounting statistics. These data 
might (significantly) differ from commercial data owing to differences in accounting 
standards. Moreover, if a firm also conducts non-regulated (commercial) activities (as 
TenneT does), the actual financial position of a firm cannot fully be assessed by only using 
regulatory data. Therefore, in a research aiming at the financeability of a firm as such, 
  18commercial data have to be used. Since our analysis is directed at the relationship between 
the regulatory framework and the financeability of the regulated part of a firm, regulatory 
accounting data are relevant. Table 3.1 offers an overview of the data we use.  
 
Table 3.1 Input data on the characteristics of the network operator in the base year 
Type of variable  Description of variable  Unit  Source* 
Value of regulatory asset base   Euro  R 
Value of assets used for system tasks  Euro  R 
Value of debt  Euro  A/R 
Share of network components in capital costs  %  R 
Share of network components in operational costs  %  R 
Stock variables (per 
ultimo base year) 
    
Size of total regulated revenues  Euro  R 
Size of regulated revenues for system tasks  Euro  R 
Size of operational costs  Euro  R 
Size of operational costs for system tasks  Euro   R 
Flow variables (over 
the whole base year) 
Size of purchases of energy for system operators tasks  Euro  R 
* R: Regulatory data base used to determine regulated revenues 
   A: Annual report  
 
3.3  Building block 2: Definition of scenarios  
The financial development of a network operator is determined by decisions taken by the 
firm itself, the regulatory framework and external factors. In this research we focus on the 
first two factors, abstracting from the influence of external factors as the purpose of this 
project is not to analyse the financeability of a firm in general (see chapter 1). We formulate 
a number of scenarios, each describing a set of assumptions regarding the behaviour of 
the firm and the regulation.  
In the Baseline Scenario,  we use regulatory parameters which are based on the formal 
decision of the Board of the NMa regarding the regulatory period 2011 – 2013 (see Table 
3.2).
 8 The investments pattern in this scenario is based on information provided by the 
firm itself, while the assumptions regarding the efficiency improvement within the firm are 
set on the same level as is assumed in the regulatory framework.  
The Firm Scenarios, in which the firm behaves differently than is assumed in the Baseline 
Scenario, are meant to explore the sensitivity of the model results to the assumptions 
                                                            
8 See http://www.energiekamer.nl/nederlands/elektriciteit/transport/tariefregulering/X-
factoren/Methodebesluit_voor_de_systeemtaken_van_TenneT_vastgesteld.asp, September 2010. 
  19made on firm behaviour. The Regulatory Scenarios, where different assumptions are made 
on specific parameters of the regulatory framework, are meant to assess the impact of 
these parameters on the model results.  
Table 3.2  Definition of scenarios 
Assumptions on the regulatory framework   































- based on formal decision of Board of NMa 
regarding the regulatory period 2011 – 2013 
(such as: WACC = 6%, frontier shift = 1,9%, 
inefficiency score TenneT TSO, including 
margin: 57%; see note 8) 
Firm: 
- investments: 460 million Euro per year in 
2010-2013 and about 125 million Euro per 
year afterwards (which are assumed to be 
100% efficient) 
- type of investments: 90% of investments 
in network expansions is treated as ‘AI’ 
(considerable investment) 
- efficiency: based on assumptions in 
regulatory framework 
- dividend policy: 50% of net profit (given 
prudent behaviour of the firm, see section 
1.4) 
Regulatory scenarios: 
R1: lower frontier shift (1,7%) 
R2: X-factor based on one-off approach 
R3: no compensation for costs and benefits 











































































  Firm scenarios: 
F1: different timing of investments 
F2: less replacement investments 
F3: less efficiency improvement by the firm 
(no repair of current inefficiency) 
 
 
In the Firm Scenarios, which analyse the impact of the assumptions on firm behaviour on 
the model results, we focus on two key components in this behaviour, i.e. the investment 
programme chosen by the firm and the efficiency improvements to be realised within the 
firm. In the Baseline Scenario it is assumed that the network operator will invest 
approximately 460 million Euro in each of the years 2010 – 2013 (see Figure 3.2). This 
  20amount of investment is based on the Annual report of TenneT, where is it said that the 
TSO wants to invest about 3 billion in 5 to 7 years of time (TenneT, 2010).
9  
 
Figure 3.2 Investment pattern in Baseline scenario, Scenario F1 and Scenario F2 
 
As said in chapter 1, we assume (purely for methodological reasons) that all investments 
are 100% efficient, implying that we ignore the efficiency assessment of investments which 
is done in practice. In the remainder of the period (after 2013), the annual investment level 
is set at about 125 million Euro, which is comparable to the level (of mainly replacement 
investments) in the base year (2009). In Scenario F1, the investment pattern is slightly 
changed in a inverted u-shape: a lower level of investments in 2010 and 2013 and a higher 
level in 2011 and 2012. In Scenario F2, we assume a lower level of replacement investments 
compared to the Baseline scenario as from 2014.
10  
 
As the regulatory revenues are linked to the level of efficient costs, the financial position of 
the firm strongly depends on the extent to which the firm is able to realise that level. In 
Scenario F3 we assume that the firm realises the yearly frontier shift, but that it is unable to 
                                                            
9 Assuming that these investments will be realised in 6.5 years, we arrive at annual amount of 460 million 
Euro. As the analysis is directed at the regulatory period 2011 – 2014, we do not take into account this high 
level of investments after this period. In addition, assuming a longer period of high investments would affect 
(i.e. complicate) the way the net present value of the economic profit has to be determined. 
10 Remember that these investment patterns are more or less arbitrarily chosen, only meant to demonstrate 
the effect of a change in the timing and size of the investments on the model results. 
  21repair the current inefficiencies within the network. This scenario gives information on the 
impact of this assumption. In Scenario R1, the regulation is made less tight by assuming a 
lower annual frontier shift, which increases the efficient cost level and, hence, the annual 
revenues. This scenario tells us how much supernormal profit a firm might make if the 
regulator sets this parameter at a too low level. In Scenario R2, we analyse the impact of 
the way the X-factor is determined. Currently, the calculation of the X-factor is based on the 
idea that revenues should equal efficient cost level at the end of a regulatory period. This 
approach is included in the Baseline scenario. In Scenario R2 the X-factor is determined by 
the one-off approach which means that revenues equal efficient cost level already in the first 
year of the new period.
11 In Scenario R3, we analyse the impact of one specific measure in 
the new framework, namely the compensation for the costs of the regulatory time lag. 
3.4  Building block 3: Calculation rules 
The calculation rules of the model refer to 5 components: 1) costs, 2) revenues, 3) need for 
and supply of capital, 4) balance sheet and 5) financial ratios (see Figure 3.3).
12  
 
Figure 3.3 Structure of the calculation rules 
Decisions of the network operator
 
                                                            
11 This one-off approach is part of the proposals of the Minister of Economic Affairs to change the current legal 
regulatory framework. 
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  22The costs of the network follow from decisions made by the network operator and external 
factors, like energy prices and labour costs. The regulatory framework has no influence on 
the actual costs of operators as result of the fundamental regulatory principle that network 
operators should be as free as possible in taking management decisions at the operator 
has far more knowledge about network management than the regulator does. As a 
consequence, the operator also determines the level and timing of investments and how 
these investments are financed. The revenues, on the contrary, are set by the regulatory 
framework. These revenues are based on the actual costs of the operator in the past, plus 
an assessment of these costs in relation to a benchmark as well as an estimation of the 
future development of the efficiency of this benchmark (see Blank et al., 2010). 
3.5  General characteristics 
3.5.1  Benchmark for profitability 
The ultimate criterion for assessing the long-term profitability of a firm is whether the rate 
of return on capital exceeds the normal rate of return on comparable investments.  The 
benchmark for the return on equity is the cost of equity which is included in the WACC, 
while the benchmark for the return on total capital is equal to the WACC. Although we 
present both outcomes, the latter is the most important for us. 
 
The first reason for this is the fact that, in the Dutch regulatory framework, a regulated firm 
is fully free to decide upon its gearing
13, which implies that it also has to carry the risk of an 
inefficient financial structure. The reward for capital (i.e. the WACC) is therefore based on a 
notional gearing, which is viewed to be reasonable given the risk premiums actually paid in 
the market for different gearings of firms operating in the same industry under comparable 
(regulatory) circumstances. By focusing on the return on total capital we do not need to 
correct for possible difference between actual and notional gearing. 
 
The second reason is related to the way investments are dealt with in this analysis. As said 
above, the investment programme is exogenously determined, based on information 
provided by the firm. This means that we do not directly take into account the option of the 
firm to change its investment pattern in order to improve its financeability. If, for instance, 
the (simulated) rate of return on equity happens to be below the rate required by the 
market then the gearing is possibly a bottleneck. Changing the investment pattern by 
                                                            
13 Although there is a legal constraint on the gearing in order to protect the firm from too high levels of debt. 
  23postponing (some) investments would reduce the need for equity and, hence, improve the 
gearing as well as the rate of return on equity. Focusing on the return on equity while 
basing the analysis on exogenous investment patterns could result in incorrect answers to 
our main research question.
14  
 
So, if the rate of return on capital (RoC) exceeds the WACC we conclude that the firm is 
able to attract sufficient capital to finance its investments. It is, however, not necessary that 
this condition is met at any moment during the life time of the infrastructure. The ultimate 
criterion is that total costs are covered by total revenues over a long period of time. 
3.5.2  Pecking order 
In assessing the firm’s ability to finance the need for capital, we assume that the firm ranks 
the several sources of financial means in a pecking order. The first source to be used 
consists of internally generated cash flows, the second one consists of debt capital and the 
third one of equity. The first source is, by definition, restricted by the historical financial 
results. The availability of debt capital is restricted by the criteria used by banks and other 
lenders of debt capital. These criteria are related to the gearing of the firm, its ability to pay 
interests and instalments and the size of the collateral to be given by the firm. When both 
internal financial means and the maximum available debt capital are insufficient to finance 
the investments, additional equity is needed. Shareholders can extend the equity of a firm 
in two ways: either by waiving the payment of dividend or by contributing additional capital.  
3.5.3  Treatment of inflation 
We abstract from the role of inflation because including it would complicate the analysis 
without adding much value. In principle the framework gives full compensation for the 
impact of inflation, implying that inflation raises costs and revenues to the same extent.
15 
Ignoring the role of inflation, however, does not mean that all financial data should be in 
real terms, as deflating nominal financial data influences the results. This holds in 
particular for interest payments: deflating interest payments underestimates the actual 
                                                            
14 Note, that the network operators are of course not fully free in deciding upon their investment programme 
because of a number of legal obligations, such as regarding connecting new energy users and maintaining 
the quality of the network. 
15 Inflation only affects financeability if the rate of inflation expected in the regulatory framework significantly 
deviates from the actual rate of inflation during the regulatory period. As the rate of inflation has been both 
rather constant and low in the Netherlands, we can safely ignore this potential impact of inflation on 
financeability.  
  24payments which have to be made to lenders of debt money.
16 In order to neutralise the 
effect of deflating, we have to calculate a rate of interest which gives the same results for 
ratios between regulated revenues and interest rates as in a nominal world. So: 
WACC r / (Interesta * g)  = WACC n / (Interest n * g)                     (1) 
 
where ‘r’ stands for real terms, ‘n’ for nominal terms, ‘a’ for adapted and ‘g’ for gearing, 
defined as debt capital / total capital. Solving this equation gives: 
Interest a = (WACC r / WACC n) * Interest n           ( 2 )  
 
This adapted rate of return enables us to define a financial model in real terms which gives 
the same results regarding financial ratios as a model in nominal terms would do. 
3.5.4  Period of analysis 
The calculation model is dynamic in the sense that most variables have a time dimension.
17 
The variables regarding the firm consists of stock quantities as well as flow quantities. The 
former describe characteristics at a specific moment, generally the first or the last day in a 
year. The flow quantities refer to the total size over a whole period, generally a (regulatory) 
year. Moreover, the parameters of the regulatory framework also refer to certain periods or 
years. Although this research is directed at the regulatory framework for the period 2011 – 
2013, we choose a much longer period as the period of analysis. The reason to do so is that 
investors in assets like energy networks, having a long life time, also use a long time 
horizon. Investment decisions are generally based on net present value analysis, taking 
into account the discounted value of all future costs and benefits. Therefore, we take a 
much longer period of analysis, which enables us to include long-term effects of the 
framework. We assume that the new regulatory framework is extended to the next periods. 
The period of analysis is set at 2010 – 2030
18, which includes six full regulatory periods of 
three years
19 (2011 – 2013, 2014 – 2016, 2017 –  2019, 2020 – 2022, 2023 –  2025, 2026 – 
2028) and 2 broken regulatory periods (2010, which is last year of the current regulatory 
period, and 2029 – 2030). The base year of the analysis is 2009 as the latest empirical data 
on the characteristics of the firm refer to that year.                                      
                                                            
16 After all, for the actual year cash flow in nominal terms are equal to the one in real terms, while actual 
interest payments using real interest rates differ significantly from on nominal basis calculated payments.  
17 The model is static in the sense that it does not include endogenous behavioural responses. 
18 Although this period of analysis is somewhat arbitrarily chosen, extending the period even further does not 
have a significant influence on the results because of the impact of discounting. 
19 The maximum length of a regulatory period is five years. We have rather arbitrarily chosen for three years. 
  254  Results 
4.1  Introduction 
In this chapter we describe the results of the model analysis. First, we demonstrate how 
revenues, costs and profits evolve in de Baseline scenario over the period of analysis 
(section 4.2). Next, we show the development in cash flows, both ingoing and outgoing, in 
that scenario (section 4.3). Then we present how the costs of inefficiency in the network are 
distributed among shareholders and consumers (section 4.4). Finally, we present the 
results on the long-term profitability for the different scenarios (section 4.5). 
4.2  Costs, revenues and net profit 
The profitability of the activities of the network operator strongly depends on the 
magnitude of the regulated revenues. These revenues consist of two components: 
transport revenues and revenues for system operator activities. As the latter are directly 
linked to the actual costs while we abstract from changes in external circumstances (see 
chapter 2), these revenues stay at a constant level (see Figure 4.1). The revenues for 
transport activities, however, show a significant increase in 2011 – 2014 as a result of the 
high level of investments.  
 
Figure 4.1 Revenues (Baseline scenario) 
 
  26In the earlier years, the transport revenues include both normal revenues from tariffs and 
revenues from considerable investments. The regulated transport revenues are indirectly 
related to the actual costs of transport activities. These revenues are linked to the level of 
efficient costs, which are in turn based on the actual costs of transportation. In Figure 4.2, 
the dotted line depicts the development of total costs of the transport activities, which 
form the basis for the determination of the level of efficient costs (shown by the bold 
dotted line
20). The efficient costs in the regulatory period 2014 -2017, for instance, depend 
on the total costs of transport in 2012 and corrections for efficiency.
21  
The solid line represents the transport revenues, while the bold solid line includes these 
revenues as well as the revenues from considerable investments. In the first two regulatory 
periods the latter form a significant part of the total transport revenues, which follows from 
the difference between the two solid lines. These additional revenues are the result of the 
considerable investments (AI) in the years 2010 – 2013, as defined by the Baseline scenario 
(see section 4.3).  As from the start of the third regulatory period (2018-2021), the transport 
revenues only consist of normal revenues. Note that in each regulatory period the total 
revenues slightly move to the level of efficient costs at the end of the period. 
 











                                                            
20 The straight line during each regulatory period follows from the fact the level of efficient costs is based on 
the last year but holds for all years in a period. 
21 Note that for the first regulatory period (2011-2014), the transport revenues are exogenously determined (by 
the x-factors included in the Methodebesluit).  
  274.3  Financial ratios and cash flows 
Because of the pecking-order principle, suppliers of debt are asked to finance if internal 
financial means are insufficient to finance investments. The supply of debt is restricted by 
criteria, which are based on four financial ratios.
22 Figure 4.3 shows that these ratios never 
pass their respective thresholds. It appears that in particular the ratio Cash flow/Debt and 
the Gearing restrict the supply of debt capital. In the Baseline Scenario, the profitability, 
measured by EBIT
23, is never the critical factor for lenders of debt. Instead, the supply is 
restricted by the ability of the firm to generate cash flows as well as by the need to manage 
the risk of insolvency. 
 
Figure 4.3 Financial ratios restricting the supply of debt capital (Baseline scenario) 
       
         Ratio: EBIT / Interest                                                Cashflow / Interest  
      
        Ratio: Cashflow / Debt                                              Gearing (Debt / (Debt + Equity)) 
 
Although the ratios do actually restrict the supply of debt, this source of capital plays a 
significant and permanent role in financing the need for capital. In most years, debt is 
responsible for about 40 to 50% of the total supply of capital (see Figure 4.4). Internal 
financial means take care of about 50 to 60% of the supply of capital. Only in the earlier 
years, when the TSO invests a lot, the contribution of debt is significantly higher. In 
                                                            
22 Obviously, by these criteria we approach the supply of debt, knowing that, in practice, more factors play a 
role. In same cases the most important factor for the supply of debt is the credit rating. 
23 Earnings before interest and taxes. 








The cash flows fluctuate significantly as a result of the (assumed) high levels of 
investments in the first years and the relatively low levels of investments later on (see 
Figure 4.5). In the beginning the investments cause a cash outflow of about 450 million 
Euros per year. In order to finance these investments, the amount of equity and debt 
capital rise strongly. As the contribution of banks is restricted by the financial ratios, 
shareholders contribute about 325 million Euros in 2010. Afterwards, the supply of debt 
capital is almost sufficient to finance the need for capital, resulting in only a low demand 
for additional equity. During the whole period, net cash flows from operations form a 
rather stable supply of cash.  
 
The annual repayments of debt form a fairly stable outflow of cash comparable to the size 
of cash flows from operations. The payment of dividend to shareholders is on the contrary 
relatively unstable. By definition, these payments are only made in case of a positive net 
profit from operations while no equity is required for financing the need for capital. 
                                                            
24 Remember that the gearing is stock quantity referring to the situation at the end of a year, while cash flows 
are flow quantities referring to a year as a period of time. This explains that a relatively high contribution of 
equity in 2010 can coincide with a rising gearing from 2010 to 2011.After all, the latter rise is due to the 
developments in 2011 where the contribution of debt is relatively high.  















































DepositOfEquity PaymentOfDividend Repayments Loans Investments NetOperationalCashFlow
 
4.4  Distribution of costs of inefficiency 
Insofar the operator is less efficient than technically possible, there is a cost of inefficiency. 
Figure 4.6 shows these costs exist, represented by the area between the real-efficient cost 
curve and the actual-cost curve. 
 

















  30In the first half of the period of analysis, both shareholders and consumers contribute to 
bearing these costs of inefficiency (see Figure 4.7). Afterwards, the shareholders’ 
contribution turn negative, implying that their revenues exceed their actual costs, as can be 
seen in Figure 4.7.
25 The contribution of consumers is also declining (in absolute terms). At 
the end of the period of analysis the costs of inefficiency are vanished, also ending the 
contribution of consumers. 
 




















4.5  Profitability 
The ultimate test of profitability is the assessment of the reward given to investors. The 
reward given to shareholders depends on the return on capital and the gearing, by 
definition. Figure 4.8 shows that return on equity starts at a relatively low level, but 
increases afterwards to approximately 10% in order to decline later on to about 7%.
26 The 
benchmark for the return on equity is the cost of equity included in the WACC. For the next 
regulatory period, this cost of equity equals 7.6%. 
 
                                                            
25 Obviously, this result is based on the assumptions made in the Baseline Scenario. If, for instance, the TSO 
is less efficient than assumed, the costs of inefficiency are higher, which are fully distributed to the 
shareholders, and vice versa. 
26 Note that the return on total invested capital in this figure is after tax, in order to be able to show the 
impact of the gearing on the return on equity, which is also after tax. 
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In order to determine whether the return on capital is sufficient, we use the WACC as 
benchmark. Figure 4.9 shows that in the first years the return on capital is below the level 
of WACC, but after a few years it is above that benchmark level.  
 
Figure 4.9 Return on capital and economic profit, both in relation to standards (Baseline 














  32This same story is also told by the development of the economic profit, which is shown 
more clearly in the same figure. The economic profit starts negative, due to the high level 
of investments, but turns positive later on. At the end of the period of analysis the 
economic profit is about zero while the return on capital is about equal to the level of the 
WACC. This pattern in economic profit is mainly driven by the investment programme and 
the way the regulated revenues are determined.  
 
The above results refer to the Baseline scenario only. From Figure 4.10 it appears that 
these results are sensitive to several assumptions made in that scenario. If the parameter 
for the frontier shift in the regulation would be, for instance, 0.2 percentage points lower 
than the firm could actually achieve (Scenario R1), the annual return on capital is about 0.1 
percentage points higher. From this figure it appears that a different way of determining 
the X-factor (Scenario R2) may have a large impact on profits. We also see that the 
inclusion of a compensation for the costs and benefits of the time lag in the regulation 
affects the results. If this compensation is left out (Scenario R3), the return on capital is 
approximately 0.2 percentage points lower. Note that in the new regulatory framework this 
compensation is included. From these regulatory scenarios we can generally conclude that 
the choice of the regulatory parameters potentially have a large impact on the profits.  
 



























































Regulatory Scenarios                    Firm Scenarios 
 
From the Firm Scenarios follow that the behaviour of the firm is also a key component. 
Reducing the annual level of investments in replacement (Scenario F2) or changing the 
time schedule of investments (Scenario F1) affect profits. However, more important for the 
profitability is the ability of the operator to repair existing inefficiencies in the network 
(Scenario F3).  
  33The final and ultimate test of profitability is looking at the net present value of the 
economic profit over the full period of analysis. Figure 4.11 shows that in the Baseline 
scenario, the net present value is about zero. This implies that, ceteris paribus, if an 
investor now participates in the network, the revenues of that participation over a long 
period of time equal the total costs, including a normal reward for capital.  
 













































From the figure one can also conclude that both regulatory parameters and the actual 
behaviour of the firm affect the long-term profitability. If the regulator sets for instance the 
parameter for the frontier shift on a too low level, compared to the actual possibilities of 
the firm, supernormal profit arise (Scenario R1). By comparing the Baseline scenario and 
Scenario R3 we can conclude that the compensation for the time lag in the regulatory 
framework surely contributes to the profitability.  
 
Regarding the behaviour of the firm, changing the timing of the investment (Scenario F1) 
or the level of investments (Scenario F2) influences the profitability, albeit it to a fairly 
small extent. More important for the financeability is the ability of the TSO to repair current 
inefficiencies (Scenario F3). If the TSO is, for instance, unable to repair the current 
inefficiency, the shareholder will face a loss of about 150 million Euro. 
 
  345  Conclusions  
1.  We conclude that the new regulatory framework for the period 2011 – 2013 enables 
TenneT TSO to finance investments in replacement and network. In the long run all 
costs, including the normal costs of capital, will be fully compensated by the 
revenues. This conclusion is subject to the condition that the TSO eliminates the 
existing inefficiencies in the network and that it is able to improve its overall 
efficiency yearly. If this condition is not met, the shareholder will possibly face a loss 
of more than one hundred million Euros. 
 
2.  In the short term, the rate of return will be lower than the level of the opportunity 
costs of capital if the operator raises its level of investments significantly. This is 
due to the fact that the regulated revenues lag behind the costs. This time lag 
follows from the regulatory principle to use actual accounting data instead of 
estimated future cost levels as basis for determining future regulatory revenues. The 
costs of this time lag are, however, compensated for in the new regulatory 
framework insofar investments are not viewed to be considerable investments. 
From the model analysis also clearly follows that the time lag results in benefits 
being higher than the costs resulting in positive economic profit in periods of 
relatively low investments. 
 
3.  The timing as well as the size of the investment affect the profitability in the short 
term. This follows from the time-lag mechanism in the determination of revenues. 
Although this effect is not negligible, it seems to be fairly small, compared to the 
impact of efficiency improvements within the firm. The latter factor appears to be 
crucial to the overall profitability and, hence, financeability, of the operator. The 
more the firm improves its efficiency, the faster the costs of the existing 
inefficiencies decreases. As a result, the contribution of shareholders in bearing 
these costs can be reduced.  
 
4.  The contribution of consumers in bearing the costs of inefficiency is determined by 
regulatory choices on the time path the TSO gets to repair current inefficiencies. In 
the regulatory period, this period is set at 15 years. 
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5.  Although the regulatory framework enables TenneT TSO to generate sufficient 
reward on capital, this does not mean that shareholders are not needed to 
contribute additional equity. Particularly in years of relatively high investments, 
additional equity is needed as a source of capital. The indispensability of 
shareholders in that case results from the fact that the supply of debt capital is 
limited by several financial criteria, such as the gearing. Given the results of this 
model analysis, we conclude that economically rational shareholders will be 
prepared to supply the additional equity that is needed by the firm. 
 
6.  Obviously, it cannot be ruled out that periods of less favourable financial 
circumstances will occur in the future. After all, the financeability of a firm does not 
only depend on the long-term profitability. It is in principle possible to give a 
network operator sufficient financial buffer capacity to deal with such adverse 
circumstances by loosening the tightness of the regulation. The downside of such a 
measure is a higher risk of supernormal profits.  An alternative of giving more 
financial leeway in advance is creating flexibility within the regulatory framework. 
Such flexibility can be used, for instance, to respond to unforeseen financial 
difficulties by temporarily allowing higher revenues during the current regulatory 
period. In designing such a flexibility, careful attention needs to be paid to prevent 
any moral hazard problems. Note, however, that the relatively short length of the 
regulatory periods (3 to 5 years) enables the regulator to periodically adapt the 
framework to new circumstances related to, for instance, the costs of capital or the 
technical efficiency of network management. 
 
7.  Finally, we stress the importance of a using a long-term perspective in assessing the 
profitability of a firm. Not only ex ante, as we have done in this research, but also ex 
post. After all, profits might temporarily be below or above normal levels because of 
the characteristics of the tariff regulation, in particular the time-lag in the 
reimbursement of (efficient) costs. Only in the long run it is possible to determine 
whether profits in network industries generate normal profits. Moreover, 
committing to a long-term perspective contributes to a climate where investors are 
less inclined to hold-up efficient investments. 
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  37Appendix: Brief description of the calculation rules in the model 
The model consists of a set of calculation rules referring to 5 components: 1) costs, 2) 
revenues, 3) need for and supply of capital, 4) balance sheet and 5) financial ratios. 
 
1. Costs 
The total costs (TOTEX) are defined as the sum of operational costs (OPEX), capital costs 
(CAPEX) and other costs.  Each of these costs are distinguished in costs related to 
transport activities and costs related to system operator activities. 
The OPEX of transport activities depend on the level in the base year, the impact of 
investments in network expansion and the annual efficiency improvements. The CAPEX 
consist of depreciation on assets and costs of capital. We base the annual depreciation on 
the past relationship between the value of the regulated asset base (RAB) and the size of 
the depreciation.
27 The cost of capital is defined as the weighted average cost rate of capital 
(WACC) times the size of the RAB. The WACC depends on a notional gearing (g), the 
return (r) on equity (E) and debt (D), and the tax rate (tr): 
 
WACC = g * r D + 1/(1+tr) * (1-g) * r E        ( 1 )  
g          = D / (D+E)                    (2) 
 
Both transport activities and system operator activities have additional costs. These costs 
include costs of energy losses and reserve capacity. In case of transport activities the group 
of other costs also include the costs of cross-border tariffs. 
 
2. Revenues 
While the costs of the network are determined by the network operator, the revenues follow 
from the regulatory framework.
28 The revenues (R) of TenneT TSO consist of transport 
revenues , revenues for system operator activities and other revenues. The transport 
revenues include two components: revenues from (normal) transport tariffs as well as 
revenues resulting from special (“considerable”) investment projects. 
                                                            
27 Because of a lack of data, we were not able to model the aging of separate network components what would 
have resulted in a vintage model. 
28 As we focus on regulatory activities, we ignore non-regulatory revenues. 




R tran,tariffs,t  =  R tran,tariffs, t-1   *   ( 1   –   X )          ( 3 )  
 
The X-factor depends on two factors: the level of efficient costs at the end of the regulatory 
period (EC) and the level of earnings from both transport tariffs and considerable 
investments in the last year of the previous period: 
 
X  =  1 – (ECln / R tran,lp) 
1/Nper            ( 4 )  
 
where lp refers to the last year of the previous period, ln to the last year in the new 
regulatory period and Nper to the length of the regulatory period in years. In this formula the 
revenues are gradually taken to the level of the efficient costs. I.e. this formula says that the 
revenues should equal the efficient costs at the end of the regulatory period. The efficient 
cost level is based on the actual cost level, the assessment of the efficiency compared to 
the frontier and a frontier shift during the new regulatory period. The actual cost level is 
based on the latest information about costs, which generally is related to two years before 
the start of the new regulatory period. By definition, these costs only refer to transport 
activities.  
 
In addition to the revenues from (normal) transport tariffs, TenneT TSO is allowed to 
receive additional revenues during the current regulatory period if it has realised 
investments projects which are viewed to be considerable (so called AI). The additional 
revenues following from these specific investments depend on both the timing and size of 
considerable investments. In the first year after realisation, 150% of these costs can be 
added to the revenues. This percentage is based on the idea that the investment was 
realised during the previous year while no revenues were received in that year. In the 
second and third year the additional revenues equal 100% of the costs. The size of these 
additional revenues are based on both operational and capital costs of the investment.  
 
                                                            
29 Note that we abstract from the role of inflation (see section 3.5.3). The common (international) 
representation of this type of regulation is “rpi – x”, where rpi stands for a measure for inflation. In the 
Netherlands the ‘rpi’ is measured by the consumer price index (cpi). 
  39While the costs of system operator activities and those of transport activities are compared 
in a similar way, the revenues for these activities are determined fundamentally differently. 
The revenues for system operator activities are based on the actual costs of the operator 
without an assessment of the efficiency of those costs. These revenues include two 
components: revenues for the purchase of energy and reserve capacity and revenues for 
transaction costs. The revenues for the purchase of energy are based on the actual costs of 
energy purchases in the three previous years
30. The revenues for transaction costs depend 
on the actual transaction costs two years before. 
 
The new regulatory framework also includes a compensation for the costs of the time lag 
between receipt of revenues and realisation of costs. This compensation holds only for 
normal (i.e. not considerable) investments. 
 
3. Need for and supply of capital 
The need for capital is equal to the sum of investments, instalments on debt and 
dividends
31. However, as we measure financeability by assessing the appeal made to the 
shareholders, we treat the payments of dividends as an endogenous variable instead of as 
an exogenous variable.  Therefore, we define the need for capital as the sum of investments 
and instalments on debt capital. The total investments include investments in network 
expansion and investments in replacement. The level of investments is exogenously 
determined. The instalments are defined as an exogenously determined annual percentage 
of total debt at the end of the previous year.  
 
In order to determine the supply of capital, we follow the pecking-order approach. First, 
internal cash flows are used as a financial source. If these cash flows are insufficient, an 
appeal to creditors is made. Finally, if the suppliers of debt are not willing to fully finance 
the remaining need for capital, shareholders are asked to offer the missing financial 
means.  
 
                                                            
30 In order to limit the energy-price risk for TenneT, the regulatory framework includes the option to correct 
the allowed revenue for the operator during the regulatory period in case the actual costs deviates from the 
revenues too much. As we do not model energy prices, this risk plays no role in this model, i.e. we assume a 
constant level of purchases of energy. 
31 Note that the payments of interests are already included in the net operational cash flow. 
  40The internal financial means result from operational cash flows (NCFop) during the year. 
The unused cash flows in previous years are also available for financing purposes in the 
form of working capital. If the internal financial means are less than the need for capital, a 
need for debt capital exists. 
In general, the supply of debt capital is restricted by criteria used by creditors. These 
criteria refer to aspects such as the ability of a firm to generate cash flows, gearing, 
collateral value of the assets and non-financial aspects like the quality of the management. 
We focus on financial criteria. As a proxy for these criteria we use the ratios applied in the 
financial supervision of energy network operators in the Netherlands These ratios are 
[EBIT/Interest], [(NCFop + Interest) /Interest], [NCFop / Debt] and [Debt/Total capital].  
If the need for capital is still not fully satisfied, there is a remaining need for capital. We 
assume that the supply of equity is unrestricted, implying that the supply of additional 
equity is always equal to the need for equity. This assumption is necessary given the 
restrictions on the other financial sources and the assumption made earlier that the 
investments, which are defined in the scenarios, will be fully realised. Remember that the 
final conclusion of the financeability depends on the return on capital.  
 
4. Balance sheet 
The balance sheet shows the value of assets, liabilities and equity at one particular 
moment, i.e. per ultimo of each year. These values result from the values in the foregoing 
balance sheet and developments during the past year. The value of the total assets (A) 
equals the sum of the values of the regulated asset base (RAB) and the working capital 
(WC). This value is also equal to the sum of debt (D) and equity (E) which together form 
total capital (C): 
 
A = RAB + WC = D + E = C                  (5) 
 
The RAB is determined by its past value, investments, depreciation and the annual 
improvement in efficiency on capital costs
32. The value of the working capital is determined 
by its past value, the net operational cash flow and the net financial cash flow. The value of 
debt is determined by its past value, new loans and instalments. The value of equity 
depends on its past value, net (accounting) profit, dividends and newly deposited equity. 
                                                            
32 In a vintage model the efficiency on CAPEX would be endogenous, but as we do not model the age and 
characteristics of the asset base, we relate the efficiency improvement to the total asset base. 
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5. Financial ratios 
We define 3 different financial ratios representing the model results: the distribution of the 
costs of inefficiency, the origin of financial means and the profitability. 
 
If a network operator operates less efficiently as technically possible, costs of inefficiency 
(TOTEXineff) occur, equal to actual costs minus the costs of the benchmark (TOTEXbenchmark). 
The costs of inefficiency have to be paid, in one way or another. Generally, these costs are 
distributed among shareholders and consumers. The contribution of shareholders is equal 
to the difference between actual costs and revenues, while the contribution of consumers 
equals the difference between revenues and the costs of the benchmark. By definition, the 
sum of both equals the total costs of inefficiency: 
 
TOTEXineff   = (TOTEX – R) + (R – TOTEXbenchmark)       (6) 
 
In order to assess the appeal made to the different financial stakeholders, we need to know 
the relative contribution of these stakeholders in financing the firm. As said above, we 
distinguish three sources of capital: operational cash flows of the firm itself, debt capital 
and equity. Relating the supply from each of these sources to the total need for capital 
gives the relative contributions of the different stakeholders. 
 
The key output ratio refers to the profitability of the firm. We measure profitability by the 
economic concept of profit. Economic Profit (Pecon) is defined as the difference between 
total revenues (R) and total costs (TOTEX), which include the costs of capital. In industries 
like energy networks where assets have fairly long life times, investors take a long-term 
perspective. This means that they can be expected to accept a temporarily 
underperformance in the return on capital, if that will be compensated by periods of 
overperformance in the future. Therefore, we have to look at the discounted value of the 
economic profit, resulting in the ultimate condition for profitability: 
                      T 
Profitability condition:  NPV Pecon =  ∑  Pecon, t    / (1 + WACC)
t     >  0       (7) 
                                                          t 
 
Here, we use the WACC as discount factor as it represents the best approximate of the 
opportunity costs of investing in the network.     
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